Picks application-level field encryption via prisma-field-encryption
(AES-256-GCM, master key from KMS) as the primary defence, combined with
volume encryption on the production Postgres host as defence in depth.
Documents:
- which fields are sensitive now (Profile.weight*, Profile.targetDate) and
which arrive in V1 (WeightEntry, FastEvent, ProgressPhoto)
- which fields stay in clear text and why (email/login, age/gender for
aggregate analytics, height/activity for plan generation)
- alternatives rejected: pgcrypto (key in queries), volume-only (no app-level
protection), client-side E2E (kills BMR/TDEE server-side calculation)
- consequences and the implementation roadmap for a follow-up PR
Status: proposed — must be implemented before opening V1 to public users.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Export enabledSocialProviders from @ketopath/auth: ['google'] when
GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID/SECRET are both set, [] otherwise
- sign-in and sign-up pages read enabledSocialProviders server-side and pass
googleEnabled to their forms; the divider and button disappear when false
- No changes to the Better Auth instance — the Google provider is still
conditionally registered, this just keeps the UI honest about it
docs/runbooks/google-oauth-setup.md walks through the Google Cloud Console
flow end-to-end (project, consent screen, credentials, redirect URIs, env
injection, verification, troubleshooting, prod considerations).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reasons (full ADR in docs/decisions/0001-auth-provider.md):
- KetoPath targets EU users with Art. 9 GDPR data; Clerk on US infra
raises Schrems II concerns
- Free, self-hostable, stays in our Postgres
- TypeScript-first, fits Next.js + Fastify + Prisma stack
CLAUDE.md updated:
- Tech stack: Better Auth on EU Postgres
- "Cosa NON fare mai": no manual password hashing
- References: Better Auth docs link
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
